Start with a contradiction
2010–2024 / 2018–2024
Brazil’s congressional recovery depends on when you start counting.
Brazil’s confidence in Congress fell 18.2 percentage points between 2010 and 2024. Looking only from 2018 to 2024 gives an increase of 14.6 points. Recovery is visible; so is the distance from the earlier level.
The two windows share the same destination: 2024. What changes is the starting point. The bars show Congress below its 2010 level but above its 2018 level. A recovery can therefore be real without restoring the confidence seen earlier.
The historical line adds what the endpoints leave out. Move the selected wave along the chart to follow the rise and fall between surveys. The early 1995 observation comes from a partially urban sample, so it provides historical perspective with a different coverage boundary.
This investigation follows Congress, political parties, the judiciary, police and armed forces separately. Positive confidence means reporting much or some confidence, among people giving a substantive answer. A person who does not know or does not answer is not counted as expressing distrust.
Methods and qualifications ↗- Congress
- Political parties
- Judiciary
- Police
- Armed forces
Brazil · 2010–2024
Change · pp
The record starts before 2010
The first observation is not always the same starting line
The archive spans 1995–2024: 457,499 interviews, 18 countries and 24 observed survey waves. The earlier years matter because a comparison beginning in 2010 can conceal the climb that preceded a subsequent fall. But a long record is not automatically a fully comparable national history.
Brazil makes the distinction tangible. Positive confidence in Congress was 27.2% in the covered 1995 sample and 27.3% in 2024. Those similar endpoints must not be read as evidence that national confidence stayed unchanged. The early sample had partial urban coverage, and the intervening observations moved substantially.
The calendar shows what was actually observed. Countries enter at different points; Nicaragua ends in 2020. Latinobarómetro interviews different people in successive waves. Missing years remain empty, and the armed-forces histories of Costa Rica and Panama are not presented as comparable military series.
Historical depth therefore adds two things: more of the trajectory, and a clearer view of the limits of the comparison. In the explorer, the full available record remains accessible alongside shorter windows; its early observations retain their coverage warnings.
Methods and qualifications ↗The survey calendar
Five institutions, one country
2010–2024
Four institutions gained confidence. The military lost it.
Between 2010 and 2024, Mexico recorded increases in confidence in Congress, parties, the judiciary and police, alongside a decline in the armed forces. Parties gained 11.0 percentage points; police gained 7.6. Even the institutions often grouped as representative or security institutions did not behave as interchangeable objects.
The country chart makes the split visible: four bars move to the positive side of zero, while the armed-forces bar moves to the negative side. The biggest gain shown here belongs to parties, not to a security institution.
That is why a single national score would be an incomplete description. The question is not only whether confidence rose, but which parts of the state gained it. These movements do not identify what caused the change; they establish the institutional pattern an explanation would need to address.
Mexico · 2010–2024
Change · pp
Brazil provides a contrast. Over the same years, Congress, parties, the judiciary and armed forces all lost confidence while police gained. The heatmap shows the components: it is the combination of movements, not one institution chosen in isolation, that describes each country.
Other countries moved more broadly. Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras and Venezuela recorded negative point changes across all five institutions; the Dominican Republic and El Salvador recorded positive ones. These are descriptions of 2010–2024, not permanent country identities or claims that every change is statistically distinguishable from zero.
Police improved relative to Congress in all 17 countries with matched endpoints. Yet that common relative result includes countries where both institutions declined. Police versus armed forces, meanwhile, split eight countries in one direction and seven in the other. The record does not describe a uniform transfer of confidence from political institutions to security institutions.
2010–2024
Police lost confidence, even as they gained ground on Congress.
Colombia adds a different test. From 2010 to 2024, all five institutions recorded declines in confidence. A relative advantage for police therefore does not necessarily describe a security institution gaining public confidence.
Congress lost 16.2 percentage points, compared with 2.9 for police. Both bars point toward declining confidence, but their lengths are very different. Police can improve their position relative to Congress while becoming less trusted in absolute terms.
This is a useful test of the regional story. A widening institutional gap does not necessarily mean that citizens are rallying behind the institution that finishes ahead. Sometimes it means that another institution has fallen much further.
Colombia · 2010–2024
Change · pp
2018–2024
Congress recovered. Military confidence fell.
Uruguay challenges the opposite shorthand: between 2018 and 2024, Congress gained 15.7 points, parties 14.5 and the judiciary 11.0, while police changed little and armed forces fell 5.3. Representative recovery and security recovery are different claims.
The strongest gains in this window belong to Congress and political parties, with the judiciary also rising. Police confidence is nearly unchanged, while confidence in the armed forces falls. The chart gives the institutions separate space instead of assigning Uruguay one direction.
Uruguay consequently complicates a simple contrast between political institutions in retreat and security institutions on the rise. Its recent pattern puts representative recovery at the center. That description belongs to 2018–2024; it is not a permanent label for the country.
Uruguay · 2018–2024
Change · pp
- Congress
- Political parties
- Judiciary
- Police
- Armed forces
Change · 2010–2024
| Country | Congress | Political parties | Judiciary | Police | Armed forces |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | -14.5 | -3.1 | -12.4 | +7.1 | +16.3 |
| Bolivia | -9.7 | -6.9 | -12.3 | -7.0 | -16.5 |
| Brazil | -18.2 | -8.9 | -16.4 | +4.0 | -18.1 |
| Chile | -22.3 | -10.1 | -19.3 | +1.1 | +2.0 |
| Colombia | -16.2 | -13.6 | -13.4 | -2.9 | -7.0 |
| Costa Rica | -23.2 | -9.1 | -1.7 | +15.1 | — |
| Dominican Republic | +10.5 | +5.6 | +13.4 | +23.2 | +24.1 |
| Ecuador | -6.0 | -8.1 | -4.0 | -0.7 | +12.5 |
| El Salvador | +16.4 | +5.1 | +30.0 | +34.5 | +11.3 |
| Guatemala | +2.8 | -0.7 | +5.0 | +9.6 | +2.2 |
| Honduras | -25.7 | -11.5 | -15.1 | -9.1 | -4.7 |
| Mexico | +2.8 | +11.0 | +7.2 | +7.6 | -4.4 |
| Nicaragua | — | — | — | — | — |
| Panama | -16.1 | -16.9 | -1.6 | +4.7 | — |
| Paraguay | -5.9 | -9.2 | +0.9 | +7.2 | -3.1 |
| Peru | -6.9 | -4.5 | +3.6 | +10.9 | +13.7 |
| Uruguay | -13.7 | -9.5 | -8.8 | +5.6 | +15.8 |
| Venezuela | -30.9 | -23.4 | -19.9 | -8.8 | -23.9 |
Brazil, reconsidered
The recovery is one stretch of a longer history
The longer record helps explain the arithmetic. Congress gained confidence between 2005 and 2010, then fell sharply by 2018. The recent rise starts after that fall. An endpoint comparison can summarize one part of this sequence while hiding another.
Parties also recover in 2018–2024, gaining 9.5 points. Police falls 2.9 points and armed forces fall 11.8. The institutions do not even share the same recent direction within Brazil.
Methods and qualifications ↗Confidence levels
Full available history · Observed years: 1995–2024
Samples, uncertainty and sources
Source-weighted share among substantive responses. Missing waves are not zero. Dots are observed surveys, not annual estimates.
Congress · Valid responses: 1,165
Political parties · Valid responses: 1,186 · Additional institutional-referent and comparability cautions apply.
Judiciary · Valid responses: 1,171 · Additional institutional-referent and comparability cautions apply.
Police · Valid responses: 1,189
Armed forces · Valid responses: 1,170 · Additional institutional-referent and comparability cautions apply.
Values and sample sizes
| Survey wave | Institutions | Estimate | Valid responses |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1995 | Congress | 27.2 % | 1148 |
| 1995 | Political parties | 17.4 % | 1170 |
| 1995 | Judiciary | 40.8 % | 1141 |
| 1995 | Police | 34.0 % | 1179 |
| 1995 | Armed forces | 60.8 % | 1157 |
| 1996 | Congress | 20.0 % | 1060 |
| 1996 | Political parties | 16.3 % | 1071 |
| 1996 | Judiciary | 41.4 % | 1068 |
| 1996 | Police | 26.6 % | 1076 |
| 1996 | Armed forces | 63.6 % | 1074 |
| 1997 | Congress | 28.1 % | 975 |
| 1997 | Political parties | 18.4 % | 979 |
| 1997 | Judiciary | 45.1 % | 972 |
| 1997 | Police | 32.0 % | 993 |
| 1997 | Armed forces | 60.2 % | 981 |
| 1998 | Congress | 23.4 % | 977 |
| 1998 | Political parties | 19.8 % | 989 |
| 1998 | Judiciary | 41.8 % | 989 |
| 1998 | Police | 24.2 % | 993 |
| 1998 | Armed forces | 52.5 % | 982 |
| 2000 | Congress | 19.0 % | 963 |
| 2000 | Political parties | 12.6 % | 981 |
| 2000 | Judiciary | 36.4 % | 973 |
| 2000 | Police | 29.0 % | 989 |
| 2000 | Armed forces | 59.7 % | 977 |
| 2001 | Congress | 24.7 % | 939 |
| 2001 | Political parties | 20.7 % | 968 |
| 2001 | Judiciary | 40.2 % | 963 |
| 2001 | Police | 32.2 % | 981 |
| 2001 | Armed forces | 54.9 % | 966 |
| 2002 | Congress | 26.2 % | 947 |
| 2002 | Political parties | 12.8 % | 969 |
| 2002 | Judiciary | 33.7 % | 964 |
| 2002 | Police | 37.8 % | 984 |
| 2002 | Armed forces | 63.1 % | 963 |
| 2003 | Congress | 29.4 % | 1157 |
| 2003 | Political parties | 15.7 % | 1188 |
| 2003 | Judiciary | 44.2 % | 1165 |
| 2003 | Police | 36.9 % | 1195 |
| 2003 | Armed forces | 56.4 % | 1158 |
| 2004 | Congress | 36.5 % | 1149 |
| 2004 | Political parties | 22.8 % | 1189 |
| 2004 | Judiciary | 49.7 % | 1160 |
| 2004 | Police | 36.3 % | 1194 |
| 2004 | Armed forces | 63.0 % | 1160 |
| 2005 | Congress | 27.5 % | 1152 |
| 2005 | Political parties | 15.8 % | 1193 |
| 2005 | Judiciary | 42.7 % | 1153 |
| 2005 | Police | 39.0 % | 1189 |
| 2005 | Armed forces | 62.6 % | 1167 |
| 2006 | Congress | 32.7 % | 1135 |
| 2006 | Political parties | 22.7 % | 1174 |
| 2006 | Judiciary | 46.1 % | 1164 |
| 2006 | Police | 42.5 % | 1186 |
| 2006 | Armed forces | 69.0 % | 1167 |
| 2007 | Congress | 24.4 % | 1158 |
| 2007 | Political parties | 16.1 % | 1191 |
| 2007 | Judiciary | 42.0 % | 1164 |
| 2007 | Police | 35.8 % | 1197 |
| 2007 | Armed forces | 68.5 % | 1181 |
| 2008 | Congress | 34.9 % | 1162 |
| 2008 | Political parties | 20.7 % | 1180 |
| 2008 | Judiciary | 42.8 % | 1163 |
| 2008 | Police | 39.6 % | 1197 |
| 2008 | Armed forces | 62.6 % | 1175 |
| 2009 | Congress | 32.8 % | 1161 |
| 2009 | Political parties | 20.8 % | 1184 |
| 2009 | Judiciary | 43.0 % | 1164 |
| 2009 | Police | 34.4 % | 1196 |
| 2009 | Armed forces | 62.8 % | 1176 |
| 2010 | Congress | 45.5 % | 1156 |
| 2010 | Political parties | 24.7 % | 1169 |
| 2010 | Judiciary | 53.0 % | 1161 |
| 2010 | Police | 40.7 % | 1186 |
| 2010 | Armed forces | 65.9 % | 1157 |
| 2011 | Congress | 31.3 % | 1172 |
| 2011 | Political parties | 15.9 % | 1197 |
| 2011 | Judiciary | 39.8 % | 1181 |
| 2011 | Police | 34.8 % | 1201 |
| 2011 | Armed forces | 63.6 % | 1192 |
| 2013 | Congress | 29.2 % | 1166 |
| 2013 | Political parties | 21.6 % | 1168 |
| 2013 | Judiciary | 42.9 % | 1156 |
| 2013 | Police | 44.2 % | 1192 |
| 2013 | Armed forces | 68.9 % | 1172 |
| 2015 | Congress | 19.4 % | 1193 |
| 2015 | Political parties | 10.4 % | 1221 |
| 2015 | Judiciary | 33.2 % | 1194 |
| 2015 | Police | 37.1 % | 1236 |
| 2015 | Armed forces | 56.7 % | 1184 |
| 2016 | Congress | 13.4 % | 1160 |
| 2016 | Political parties | 5.3 % | 1189 |
| 2016 | Judiciary | 39.9 % | 1163 |
| 2016 | Police | 39.5 % | 1194 |
| 2016 | Armed forces | 57.4 % | 1155 |
| 2017 | Congress | 11.0 % | 1163 |
| 2017 | Political parties | 6.7 % | 1186 |
| 2017 | Judiciary | 27.8 % | 1163 |
| 2017 | Police | 34.5 % | 1190 |
| 2017 | Armed forces | 52.4 % | 1148 |
| 2018 | Congress | 12.7 % | 1165 |
| 2018 | Political parties | 6.3 % | 1186 |
| 2018 | Judiciary | 33.7 % | 1171 |
| 2018 | Police | 47.6 % | 1189 |
| 2018 | Armed forces | 59.6 % | 1170 |
| 2020 | Congress | 23.9 % | 1167 |
| 2020 | Political parties | 13.1 % | 1186 |
| 2020 | Judiciary | 37.0 % | 1170 |
| 2020 | Police | 48.2 % | 1194 |
| 2020 | Armed forces | 58.0 % | 1176 |
| 2023 | Congress | 30.8 % | 1160 |
| 2023 | Political parties | 18.6 % | 1185 |
| 2023 | Judiciary | 37.5 % | 1170 |
| 2023 | Police | 48.2 % | 1182 |
| 2023 | Armed forces | 49.7 % | 1177 |
| 2024 | Congress | 27.3 % | 1149 |
| 2024 | Political parties | 15.9 % | 1185 |
| 2024 | Judiciary | 36.6 % | 1160 |
| 2024 | Police | 44.7 % | 1195 |
| 2024 | Armed forces | 47.8 % | 1180 |
The government is not every institution
2024
Government approval reaches beyond elected institutions.
Do people who approve of their government also tend to trust the country’s institutions more?
The survey asks two different things: whether people approve or disapprove of the government, and whether they have confidence in institutions such as Congress or the armed forces. Here, we compare the answers of government approvers and disapprovers.
In Argentina in 2024, people who approved of the government were more likely to express confidence in Congress. After accounting for age and recorded sex, their estimated probability of expressing confidence was 15.5 percentage points higher than that of people who disapproved.
For the armed forces, the difference was 33.6 percentage points—more than twice as large. These numbers describe the distance between the two groups. They do not mean that 33.6% of Argentines trusted the military, or that confidence rose by that amount.
The contrast extends beyond elected institutions: the estimated difference was larger for the armed forces than for Congress. All five institutions examined in this Argentine survey had positive differences, but their size varied.
The historical models compare government approvers and disapprovers separately within each country and survey wave. Precise national extension summaries remain incompletely documented and are not used here.
These are comparisons between groups of respondents, not an experiment or evidence that approving a government causes confidence. How people evaluate their government and its institutions is connected, but the answers are not interchangeable.
A percentage-point difference is the distance between two estimated probabilities. The comparison here is between government approvers and disapprovers interviewed in the same survey, accounting for age and recorded sex. It is not a comparison of Argentina before and after a change of government.
The larger military gap gives the case its significance. Evaluations of the incumbent reach beyond elected institutions in these responses. The association could reflect shared evaluations or other political relationships; the model does not isolate a causal mechanism.
Methods and qualifications ↗Argentina, 2024
Adjusted difference (percentage points)
See all five institutions and uncertainty
Common sample: 1,091 respondents. National weights; age/recorded-sex adjustment. Intervals use the inherited conditional uncertainty estimates.
| Institutions | Adjusted difference (percentage points) | 95% interval |
|---|---|---|
| Congress | +15.5 | 9.8 / 21.2 |
| Political parties | +10.1 | 4.9 / 15.3 |
| Judiciary | +21.5 | 16.0 / 27.0 |
| Police | +28.0 | 22.0 / 34.1 |
| Armed forces | +33.6 | 27.8 / 39.4 |
Explore approval associations
The historical models compare government approvers and disapprovers separately within each country and survey wave. Precise national extension summaries remain incompletely documented and are not used here.
Sources: inherited approval estimates; frozen research report, p. 13. Methods and qualifications ↗
Behind the comparisons
Behind these charts is a much larger research effort.
The analytical archive contains 457,499 respondent records from 24 observed survey waves in 18 countries, organized into 413 country–wave samples spanning 1995–2024. These are archive-wide counts, not the sample for every chart or model. The work behind the publication was to turn that uneven historical record into comparisons whose definitions and boundaries can be inspected.
A shared column name is only a starting point. The project assembled source files and metadata, identified candidate variables, checked wording and response scales, established harmonization and exclusion rules, and constructed eligible series. Consistency and robustness checks then tested how sensitive the findings were to documented analytical choices. The decision trail matters as much as the volume of records.
The contribution has two parts. Empirically, the project makes institutional trajectories easier to compare across countries and periods. Methodologically, it provides a documented framework for deciding which historical comparisons are defensible. Public code, methods and the audit make that framework inspectable; some reproduction still depends on external data and incomplete historical artifacts.
The archive behind the comparisons
- 457,499
- interview records in the frozen harmonized archive
- 18
- countries
- 24
- observed survey waves
- 413
- country-wave samples
- 5
- institutional confidence measures
1995–2024 describes the archive, not complete coverage for every measure. The interview count is not a separate total of unique people followed over time. Valid answers and model samples are smaller and vary by question. No separate source-versus-harmonized respondent count is asserted here.
Identify
Locate source questions, labels and codes for each institution and wave. Preserve the original item and its provenance; a matching variable name is only a candidate link.
Compare
Check wording, response scales and national institutional referents against the documentation. Retain comparability classifications and measurement segments; availability alone does not establish equivalence.
Standardize
For confidence, combine “much” and “some” (categories 1/2) as positive, against “little” and “none” (3/4). Keep non-substantive responses distinct where the source permits.
Validate
Establish country–wave–institution coverage and eligibility. An unavailable item stays missing; incompatible episodes remain separate or excluded. Costa Rica and Panama, for example, are not assigned zero military confidence when a comparable armed-forces referent is absent.
Document
Freeze the harmonized dataset and retain coding, clearance, sample restrictions and source links. Use original national weights within each country-wave and substantive answers as the primary denominator; national weights are not regional population weights.
Why does a study beginning in 1995 sometimes start its comparisons in 2010?
The archive begins in 1995, but a comparison needs more than an early observation. It needs the relevant institutions and countries observed at both chosen endpoints, with their measurement restrictions retained. The documented 2010–2024 comparison pairs 17 countries for Congress, parties, judiciary and police, and 15 for armed forces. It is one analytical window, alongside earlier histories and other endpoint comparisons; 2010 is not a universal threshold of survey quality. Brazil illustrates the distinction: its 1995 Congress observation is available, but the early sample had partial urban coverage. Comparing it with 2024 therefore describes the covered samples, not an unchanged national population. Earlier observations have not been discarded. They remain in the historical explorer where defensible, with missing waves and design boundaries preserved. A common comparison window makes the country set explicit; the full record shows what that window leaves outside.
Harmonization makes definitions explicit; it does not make three decades of surveys identical. These are different respondents at each wave. Sampling frames, territorial coverage and unavailable survey-design details still limit inference. The findings describe confidence and associations, not individual change or causal effects.
One definition, carefully checked
Much or some confidence
1Little or no confidence
0Don’t know / no response
Kept outside the substantive denominatorWhat confidence does not tell us
Distrust of an institution is not a vote against democracy
Being satisfied with how democracy works is different from supporting democracy as a political principle. Confidence in Congress is different again. Treating these as one attitude would erase a distinction the evidence preserves.
2018–2024
Police gained confidence. Courts and parties lost it.
Chile shows why those distinctions matter. Between 2018 and 2024, police confidence rose 14.7 points and military confidence 6.4, while judiciary confidence fell 8.6 and party confidence 2.4. This institutional configuration does not establish whether Chileans became more committed to democracy.
The change chart shows police and armed forces moving upward while courts and parties move downward. Those contrasting directions describe how confidence was distributed across institutions over this period.
To ask whether Chileans became more satisfied with democracy, or more committed to democratic principles, we would need to examine those separate questions. Chile’s institutional pattern makes that distinction concrete: confidence in one part of the state cannot stand in for a judgment about the whole democratic system.
Chile · 2018–2024
Change · pp
A person can disapprove of the government, distrust Congress and still prefer democracy to any alternative. These judgments may overlap, but they ask different questions. Government approval evaluates the administration in office. Institutional confidence concerns a particular institution. Satisfaction with democracy evaluates how democracy works; support for democracy concerns its desirability as a political system.
The distinction becomes more consequential when the question shifts from confidence to political legitimacy.
2010–2024 / 2018–2024
Confidence figures cannot settle the question of legitimacy.
Venezuela also resists a single description. All five confidence measures declined between 2010 and 2024. Yet from 2018 to 2024, police rose 10.2 points, armed forces 7.2 and parties 6.3, while Congress fell 0.9. These reported responses cannot establish democratic legitimacy, nor can the surveys alone establish that respondents concealed their preferences. Political response environments and incomplete national-questionnaire verification constrain stronger interpretations. The seven countries used in this presentation illustrate distinct puzzles; the explorer retains all 18.
The line chart brings the different windows into the same view. The rise after 2018 in several institutions sits inside a longer record in which all five ended below their 2010 levels. As in Brazil, the starting year changes which part of the history becomes visible.
There is also an interpretive boundary. Reported confidence in an institution and democratic legitimacy are different judgments. These surveys record the answers people gave; they do not reveal hidden preferences or establish how the political response environment shaped each answer. Venezuela sharpens the question that runs through the presentation: confidence in what, compared with when, and with what meaning?
Confidence levels
Selected window: 2010–2024 · Observed years: 2010–2024
Samples, uncertainty and sources
Source-weighted share among substantive responses. Missing waves are not zero. Dots are observed surveys, not annual estimates.
Congress · Valid responses: 1,174
Political parties · Valid responses: 1,163 · Additional institutional-referent and comparability cautions apply.
Judiciary · Valid responses: 1,167 · Additional institutional-referent and comparability cautions apply.
Police · Valid responses: 1,182
Armed forces · Valid responses: 1,182 · Additional institutional-referent and comparability cautions apply.
Values and sample sizes
| Survey wave | Institutions | Estimate | Valid responses |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | Congress | 50.6 % | 1171 |
| 2010 | Political parties | 43.9 % | 1170 |
| 2010 | Judiciary | 39.4 % | 1157 |
| 2010 | Police | 31.1 % | 1188 |
| 2010 | Armed forces | 50.1 % | 1167 |
| 2011 | Congress | 43.5 % | 1176 |
| 2011 | Political parties | 35.5 % | 1183 |
| 2011 | Judiciary | 37.6 % | 1179 |
| 2011 | Police | 26.4 % | 1194 |
| 2011 | Armed forces | 46.1 % | 1180 |
| 2013 | Congress | 41.9 % | 1168 |
| 2013 | Political parties | 43.0 % | 1173 |
| 2013 | Judiciary | 40.1 % | 1164 |
| 2013 | Police | 39.7 % | 1177 |
| 2013 | Armed forces | 54.9 % | 1186 |
| 2015 | Congress | 29.1 % | 1192 |
| 2015 | Political parties | 21.6 % | 1198 |
| 2015 | Judiciary | 25.9 % | 1186 |
| 2015 | Police | 16.1 % | 1190 |
| 2015 | Armed forces | 36.4 % | 1196 |
| 2016 | Congress | 40.3 % | 1190 |
| 2016 | Political parties | 20.5 % | 1187 |
| 2016 | Judiciary | 19.0 % | 1188 |
| 2016 | Police | 15.8 % | 1199 |
| 2016 | Armed forces | 28.0 % | 1199 |
| 2017 | Congress | 37.7 % | 1174 |
| 2017 | Political parties | 30.7 % | 1183 |
| 2017 | Judiciary | 26.6 % | 1180 |
| 2017 | Police | 28.6 % | 1192 |
| 2017 | Armed forces | 34.8 % | 1194 |
| 2018 | Congress | 20.6 % | 1178 |
| 2018 | Political parties | 14.2 % | 1182 |
| 2018 | Judiciary | 17.9 % | 1175 |
| 2018 | Police | 12.1 % | 1195 |
| 2018 | Armed forces | 19.1 % | 1191 |
| 2020 | Congress | 19.7 % | 1168 |
| 2020 | Political parties | 15.1 % | 1178 |
| 2020 | Judiciary | 18.3 % | 1170 |
| 2020 | Police | 13.6 % | 1187 |
| 2020 | Armed forces | 20.6 % | 1188 |
| 2023 | Congress | 23.6 % | 1179 |
| 2023 | Political parties | 16.3 % | 1183 |
| 2023 | Judiciary | 24.6 % | 1180 |
| 2023 | Police | 21.8 % | 1196 |
| 2023 | Armed forces | 26.5 % | 1192 |
| 2024 | Congress | 19.7 % | 1174 |
| 2024 | Political parties | 20.5 % | 1163 |
| 2024 | Judiciary | 19.5 % | 1167 |
| 2024 | Police | 22.3 % | 1182 |
| 2024 | Armed forces | 26.2 % | 1182 |
Different democratic evaluations, different relationships
Four questions, four objects of evaluation
Institutional confidence
Confidence in a particular institution.
Government approval
Evaluation of the government in office.
Satisfaction with democracy
Evaluation of how democracy works.
Support for democracy
Preference for democracy as a political system.